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1. Introduction 
 
An important class of metaethical views seek to explain what it is for something to fall under an 
ethical or evaluative category in terms of its being something towards which we ought, or have 
reasons, to have certain kinds of attitudes. These Fitting Attitude [FA-] Analyses might hold, for 
instance, that an outcome’s goodness consists in its being an outcome we should desire or have 
“pro-attitudes” towards (Ewing 1939); or that an action’s moral blameworthiness consists in the 
fact that the agent who performed it ought to feel guilty, and that others are justified in feeling 
resentment or indignation at her, for doing it (Gibbard 1990, ch 3 and 7).1  
FA-analyses are attractive as a way of helping to provide a simple and unified picture of 
how values and reasons fit together, by explaining the distinctive normative or prescriptive 
features of ethical and evaluative categories as stemming from the deontic categories of oughts 
or reasons in terms of which they are explicated (cf. Rabinowicz and Ronnow-Rasmussen: 391-
2; Olson 2004: 295). The judgment that an outcome is good (or that an action is blameworthy) 
seems to “speak in favor” of desiring (or feeling guilt and anger towards) it, in much the same 
way that the judgment that a belief is warranted by one’s evidence speaks in favor of the belief, 
or that a judgment that one should plan or intend to do something speaks in favor of intending to 
do it. Ethical and evaluative judgments seem to have the distinctive properties of this broader 
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class of judgments about what attitudes we ought, or have reasons, to have – such as their being 
“essentially [coherently] contestable” (cf. D’Arms and Jacobson 2000b), in the sense that it 
seems conceptually coherent to affirm or deny most of them; our having to determine which of 
these coherent judgments are correct by means of a priori philosophical arguments; and their 
exerting a significant (if defeasible) influence on the attitudes we come to have (Gibbard 1990; 
Persson 2007; Raz 2009). FA-analyses can compactly explain this by holding that ethical and 
evaluative judgments simply are specific instances of judgments about what attitudes we ought, 
or have reasons, to have. The alternatives to FA-analyses hold either that ethical and evaluative 
categories are distinct from but substantively related to those of reasons for attitudes like 
emotions and desires (Dancy 2000; Zimmerman 2007), or that what it is to have reasons for such 
attitudes just is for their objects to have the relevant ethical and evaluative properties (Orisi 
2013). It is much less clear on these views how ethical and evaluative categories are related to 
other normative categories like those of reasons for belief and intention, and how and why they 
share the same central normative features.  
These attractions of FA-analyses are compatible with whatever one takes to be the best 
fundamental metaethical (or ‘metanormative’) account of judgments or facts about what attitudes 
we ought, or have reasons, to have – such as robust realism, expressivism, or reductive realism 
(all three of which have been favored by different proponents of FA-analyses, such as Ewing 
1939; Gibbard 1990; and Brandt 1946; respectively). FA-analyses are thus a kind of “non-
fundamental” metanormative account, which seek to explain the metaphysics and / or semantics 
of one normative category in terms of another normative category, without committing to any 
particular view about the underlying metaphysics or semantics of the explaining category.   
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One of the main problems for FA-analyses is that – at least at the outset of inquiry – there seem 
to be reasons for or against having the relevant attitudes towards things that do not bear on 
whether those things fall under the relevant ethical or evaluative categories. For instance, 
suppose that an evil demon credibly threatened to harm your loved ones unless you desired to 
have an odd number of hairs on your head (cf. Crisp 2000). The fact that the demon will spare 
your loved ones just in case you desire that you have an odd number of hairs seems to be a 
reason – or to make it the case that you ought – to desire that you have an odd number of hairs. 
But it does not make your having an odd number of hairs good. Similarly, the fact that you were 
causally involved in a someone’s death, even though you took all reasonable precautions to 
avoid it, seems to be a reason to feel guilt for what you did, or a factor that makes guilt on your 
part appropriate (Greenspan 1992). But it does not seem to make it the case that your conduct 
was blameworthy.   
Proponents of FA-analyses [FA-analysts] will want to insist that, although considerations 
like the demon’s threat or your causal involvement in the death in some sense count in favor of 
your having (or at least wanting or getting yourself to have) the relevant attitudes, they are not 
the kinds of reasons intended by FA-analyses. To mark the intended distinction, we can say that 
FA-analyses hold that something falls under an ethical or evaluative category just in case it is 
fitting to have the relevant attitudes towards it, and that the reasons or oughts constituted by 
things like the demon’s threat or your causal involvement in the death do not bear on the 
fittingness of the relevant attitudes (hence the name ‘fitting attitude analyses’ – cf. D’Arms and 
Jacobson 2000b: 746; Rabinowicz and Ronnow-Rasmussen 2004: 422-3). But herein lurks a 
problem for the FA-analyst – namely that, unless some further argument or account is offered, it 
might seem that the only thing that distinguishes considerations that bear upon an attitude’s 
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fittingness from those that do not is that the former, but not the latter, make for the instantiation 
of the ethical or evaluative category that the FA-analyst is trying to analyze. Why, for instance, 
does the fact that an outcome involves a puppy’s being happy contribute to the fittingness of a 
desire for it, while the fact that a demon will harm one’s loved ones if one does not desire some 
outcome not contribute to the fittingness of a desire for it? A natural explanation is that an 
outcome’s involving the puppy’s happiness contributes to its goodness, while its being such that 
desiring it will spare one’s loved ones does not. But if this is what the FA-analyst must say to 
distinguish fittingness from non-fittingness reasons, her account of the kind of reasons for 
attitudes she is talking about in her analyses looks viciously circular.  
FA-analysts thus face a problem of explaining what distinguishes fittingness reasons to 
have attitudes from non-fittingness reasons with respect to those attitudes, without running into 
the vicious circularity of invoking the ethical concepts they are trying to analyze in the first 
place. This is the Wrong Kind of Reasons [WKR] problem with which I will be concerned in this 
chapter. I believe that this is a maximally general way of understanding the distinctive problem, 
described by this phrase in the literature, which is faced by all FA-analyses – regardless of 
whether they speak explicitly of a distinct category of fittingness (or simply different kinds of 
‘reasons’), allow that non-fittingness reasons with respect to an attitude are genuine reasons for 
the attitude (or insist that they are only reasons to “want to” or “make ourselves have” the 
attitude), and whether they offer a reductive account of the distinction between fittingness and 
non-fittingness reasons (or  take the category of fittingness as more or less primitive). On the 
other hand, because solutions to this problem are constrained by the FA-analyst’s need to 
distinguish the ‘right’ from the ‘wrong’ kind of reasons without invoking corresponding ethical 
and evaluative categories, it is (at least potentially) a more specific problem than that sometimes 
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referred to as a ‘WKR problem’ of distinguishing different kinds of reasons for attitudes, such as 
epistemic from non-epistemic reasons for beliefs, and reasons to intend to do things that do as 
opposed to do not constitute reasons to act out of them.  
 
I think that the main responses to the WKR problem can be divided into three general kinds of 
approaches. The first and to date most popular material approach seeks to explain the distinction 
between fittingness and non-fittingness reasons in terms of what features of considerations make 
them eligible as opposed to ineligible to serve as fittingness reasons. Perhaps the best known 
version of the material approach, inspired by Parfit (2001), holds that fittingness reasons to have 
an attitude must be “object-given,” or cite features of the attitude’s object, while non-fittingness 
reasons with respect to the attitude are “state-given,” or cite features of the state of having the 
attitude. A second, constitutivist approach seeks to distinguish fittingness from non-fittingness 
reasons by holding that, while fittingness reasons for an attitude pertain to the concerns or 
commitments constitutive of having the attitude at all, non-fittingness reasons with respect to the 
attitude stem from concerns external to the attitude’s essence. A third, formal approach seeks to 
explain the distinction between fittingness and non-fittingness reasons in terms of features of 
judgments or inferences about these different kinds of reasons. Perhaps the most natural version 
of this view is that our attitudes can respond directly to what we take to be fittingness reasons for 
them, while they can only respond indirectly to what we take to be non-fittingness reasons.  
In the next three sections I will explore each of these approaches to solving the WKR 
problem. As I will conclude in the fifth and final section, I believe that each approach answers to 
distinctive motivations and faces distinctive problems. In many of the cases considered in the 
literature, there seems to be a common structure that separates fittingness from non-fittingness 
reasons, which appropriately motivates material approaches. But proponents of material 
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approaches seem to overlook other kinds of cases – like that of feeling guilt in response to one’s 
causal involvement in harm from an unavoidable accident – where the reasons need not conform 
to this structure. Constitutivist approaches seem applicable to both the cases that animate the 
material approach and many of the cases it ignores. But there are concerns about whether FA-
analysts can explain the idea of the relevant attitudes’ constitutive aims without incurring vicious 
circularity. Formal approaches promise maximal generality without vicious circularity. But the 
features of judgments about fittingness reasons adduced by existing formal approaches do not 
seem sufficient to distinguish them from all judgments about non-fittingness reasons.  
 
 
2. Material Approaches 
 
Material approaches, like most existing solutions to the WKR problem, have been focused on 
cases that resemble (in a sense I will clarify) that of Roger Crisp’s demon, who (on my telling) 
threatens to harm your loved ones unless you desire to have an odd number of hairs. I believe 
that material approaches have made genuine progress on the problem of giving a compelling, 
non-circular explanation of what distinguishes fittingness form non-fittingness reasons in such 
cases. Initially, Wlodek Rabinowicz and Toni Ronnow-Rasmussen (2004) surveyed and rejected 
several material approaches, including the highly influential, Parfit-inspired: 
 
Object-Given vs. State-Given Proposal: Consideration R is a fittingness reason to have 
attitude A towards object O [i.e. R is the kind of reason to have A towards O, the 
existence of which FA-analyses should say makes it the case that O falls under some 
ethical or evaluative category] only if R cites properties of O. If R cites properties of the 
state of having A towards O, then R is not a fittingness reason to have A towards O.  
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Since the fact that desiring to have an odd number of hairs will spare one’s loved ones harm 
cites a property of the state of desiring an odd number of hairs, this proposal seems to correctly 
avoid counting it as a fittingness reason to have this desire. It also seems to correctly count, for 
instance, the fact that a puppy’s having companions will make her happy as a fittingness reason 
to desire her having companions, since the fact cites a property of the outcome of the puppy’s 
having companions, which is the object of the desire for which it is a reason.  
 However, as Rabinowicz and Ronnow-Rasmussen (2004: 407-8) observed, there are 
cases in which non-fittingness reasons to have certain attitudes seem to cite properties of the 
objects of those attitudes, such as 
 
The Admiration-Demanding Demon. This demon credibly threatens to harm your loved 
ones unless you admire him.  
 
Here, the fact that the demon will harm your loved ones unless you admire him is surely a non-
fittingness reason to (make yourself) admire him. But because it cites a property of the demon, 
the object-given vs. state-given proposal seems to incorrectly count it as a fittingness reason to 
admire him.  
In response, Jonas Olson (2004: 299) proposed, in effect, that one must strengthen this 
proposal’s account of fittingness reasons to 
 
Olson’s Proposal: R is a fittingness reason to have A only if R makes no reference to A.  
 
Since the fact that the demon will harm your loved ones unless you admire him makes reference 
to admiration, Olson’s proposal correctly avoids counting it as a fittingness reason. But, as 
Rabinowicz and Ronnow-Rasmussen (2006: 118) observed, Olson’s proposal seems to go too 
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far, since there are cases where fittingness reasons to have attitudes make reference to those 
attitudes, such as 
 
 Modesty. Allan is indifferent to whether we admire him. 
 
The fact that Allan is indifferent to our admiring him seems to be a fittingness reason to admire 
him – such modestly genuinely contributes to his admirably. But because this fact makes 
reference to admiration, it appears that Olson’s proposal cannot count it as such. 
 Generalizing a proposal by Gerald Lang (2008), in response to important criticisms of 
Olson (2009), Lars Samuelsson (2013) argues that we can solve the WKR problem through the 
appropriate interpretation of  
 
Samuelsson’s Proposal: R is a fittingness reason to have A only if R does not cite or 
depend upon the consequences of having A. 
 
Samuelsson does not here wish to restrict ‘consequences’ to causal consequences (398-92), 
since, like Rabinowicz and Ronnow-Rasmussen (2004: 403-4), he observes that there can be 
cases like those of  
 
Mental State Axiologies. These views hold that it is intrinsically good that we have 
certain mental states, even if their objects lack intrinsic value (e.g. one might think deep 
immersion in a project is intrinsically good, even if the project lacks intrinsic value). 
 
Such views might coherently hold, for instance, that the fact that one’s attitude towards grass 
counting would be one of deep immersion is a non-fittingness reason to (make oneself) have that 
attitude – an intrinsic reason to (make ourselves) have it that does not contribute to grass-
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counting’s intrinsic value – even though the fact makes no reference to the attitude’s causal 
consequences. But Samuelsson’s proposal can allow this if we understand “the consequences of 
having an attitude” to include non-causal consequences, such as the bringing about of the state of 
affairs of one’s having it. So interpreted, Samuelsson’s proposal seems right that (a) the 
axiologies in question take us to have reasons to (make ourselves) have the relevant attitudes in 
virtue of our having reasons to value the state of affairs of our having them, and (b) this 
distinguishes these reasons to (make ourselves) have attitudes from fittingness reasons (e.g. the 
fact that companions would make a puppy happy as a reason to desire that she has them), which 
do not seem to depend upon the value of the state of affairs of our having them. With fittingness 
reasons, the direction of explanation may often go the other way around: we have reasons to 
value the state of affairs of our having certain attitudes in virtue of our having fittingness reasons 
to have them (Nye, Plunkett, and Ku 2015: 16). 
 
I believe that the non-fittingness reasons to (make ourselves) have attitudes upon which material 
approaches have focused all resemble those provided by Crisp’s demon, in that they depend 
upon our reasons to care about the consequences of those attitudes (broadly construed). There 
seem, however, to be non-fittingness reasons that do not fit this pattern, which material 
approaches appear to have ignored. These may include the example from Section 1 of the fact 
that your conduct was causally involved in someone’s death despite all reasonable precautions 
as a genuine reason to (make yourself) feel guilt for your conduct, but not a fittingness reason to 
feel guilt that constitutes your blameworthiness. A defender of Samuelsson’s proposal might 
insist that you have this reason because feeling such guilt partially constitutes having a good 
moral character, and you should desire the state of affairs of having a good moral character (cf. 
D’Arms and Jacobson 2014: 30). But it seems coherent – and indeed quite plausible – to think 
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instead that, much like a fittingness reason to feel guilt (e.g. that you deliberately harmed 
someone for fun), the fact that you were causally involved in someone’s death is a reason to 
(make yourself) feel guilt quite independently of the consequences of doing so, including the 
intrinsic value of the state of affairs of your feeling guilt or being morally good. One might insist 
that, although mere causal involvement in harm does not make guilt fitting (in the sense that 
entails blameworthiness), it makes guilt “morally appropriate”, and that such appropriateness-
making reasons cannot be explained by – but may instead help explain – which states of feeling 
guilt we should value.  
D’Arms and Jacobson have explored many other examples of non-fittingness, 
“appropriateness-making” reasons to (make ourselves) have or omit having attitudes, some of 
which at least arguably do not depend upon the value of the states of our having them. These 
include factors that would make it petty to envy someone’s accomplishments, even if they are 
genuinely good and this reflects poorly on oneself (2000a: 73-4; 2014: 24-5), factors that make 
genuinely funny jokes morally inappropriate (2000a: 80-1; 2014: 10-19), factors that make it 
admirable or noble to be unafraid of genuinely fearful odds (2000a: 85), and factors that make it 
morally virtuous to pity morally deserved suffering (2014: 38-40). Simply at the level of what 
features a reason does or does not concern (in relation to the object of an attitude or the upshot of 
having it), there seems to be no common feature that this wide variety of “appropriateness-
making” reasons share with the broadly “pragmatic” reasons upon which material approaches 
have focused. This suggests that material approaches will not be successful in explaining what 
distinguishes all non-fittingness reasons from fittingness reasons. 
It is important to understand that proponents of material approaches cannot solve this 
problem by arguing that, as a substantive ethical matter, there are no appropriateness-making 
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reasons to (make ourselves) have attitudes that do not depend upon our reasons to care about the 
broad consequences of having those attitudes. FA-analyses are metaethcial theories, which hold 
that what is at issue between rival substantive ethical and evaluative views is what attitudes we 
have fittingness reasons to have. As such, they must provide interpretations of all coherent, or at 
least all reasonably plausible, ethical views as views about fittingness reasons. This requires 
solving the WKR problem of distinguishing fittingness from non-fittingness reasons in a way 
that works for all coherent, or at least all reasonably plausible, ethical views – many of which are 
substantively false.  
 
 
3. Constitutivist Approaches 
 
A natural way of trying to articulate what separates the fittingness reasons for attitudes that 
constitute something’s falling under an ethical or evaluative category from both pragmatic and 
appropriateness-making reasons is the following. It might seem that certain evaluative concerns 
or questions are somehow internal to or constitutive of having the attitudes at all. For instance, 
envy might seem essentially to portray its object as having something valuable, your relative lack 
of which reflects badly on you (D’Arms and Jacobson 2000a: 64). Other evaluative concerns, 
including both whether envy would have good consequences and whether it would be morally 
inappropriate, petty, or ignoble, seem to be “external” to envy, in the sense that they go beyond 
how envy portrays its object (D’Arms and Jacobson 2000a: 73-4), or what we commit ourselves 
to in envying it (cf. Hieronymi 2005). If we can draw such a distinction between the concerns 
constitutive of as opposed to external to an attitude, we can try solving the WKR problem by 
appealing to some version of 
 
The Wrong Kind of Reasons (REVISED)  Howard Nye 
12 
 
The Constitutivist Proposal: Fittingness reasons for attitude A are considerations that 
show A to “fit” its object, by showing A’s object to have the features that A is 
constitutively concerned with. Non-fittingness reasons to (make oneself) have A do not 
speak to A’s constitutive concerns (cf. D’Arms and Jacboson 2000a; 2006; Hieronymi 
2005; Schroeder 2010). 
 
 In addition to offering a convincing explanation of what separates fittingness reasons 
from both pragmatic and appropriateness-making reasons, it seems that this approach can make 
sense of what is at issue between many different coherent ethical views. Suppose, for instance, 
that a member of an honor-loving, acetic warrior caste lives a life of immense enjoyment by 
killing a record number of opponents in wars of conquest. Many of us might think that the fact 
that  
 
E: He enjoyed his life so much  
 
makes his life enviable in a respect, but the fact that  
 
K: He killed so many opponents in wars of conquest   
 
is a reason not to (allow ourselves to) envy him, which does not make his life less enviable. But 
his fellow warriors, who think that killing opponents in wars of conquest is the highest good and 
despise the love of pleasure as lowly, might think instead that the fact that K makes his life 
enviable, while the fact that E is a reason not to (allow themselves to) envy him that does not 
make his life less enviable. The constitutivist proposal can give the following compelling 
explanation of the difference between our thoughts. We take E to bear upon envy’s constitutive 
concerns by showing the warrior to have something valuable that we lack, while we take K to 
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bear upon considerations external to envy (viz. whether the envy is morally appropriate). His 
fellow warriors, on the other hand, take K to bear on envy’s constitutive concerns by showing 
him to have something valuable that they lack, while they take E to bear upon considerations 
external to envy (viz. whether the envy would involve a cowardly desire for a pleasant life). 
 
The main problems for constitutivist approaches concern whether they really can draw a 
distinction between evaluations that are constitutive of as opposed to external to attitudes, in a 
way that solves the WKR problem for FA-analyses. First, there are problems about what it is for 
an evaluation to be constitutive of an attitude. The most natural idea here is that part of what it is 
to have the attitude is to make the evaluation, either the form of a judgment (Foot 1963), an 
entertained thought (Greenspan 1988), or a percept-like “construal” (Roberts 1988). Because 
D’Arms and Jacobson (2003) argue (quite convincingly) against all of these ideas, their talk of 
attitudes “presenting” things as falling under constitutive evaluations seems metaphorical. One 
way they suggest of cashing out the metaphor is that evaluations constitutive of attitudes must 
play “deep” and “wide” roles in the psychology of almost all humans, in that they fit at least 
many of our deeply entrenched tendencies to have them, and speak to a wide variety of our other 
concerns (2006: 116-18). But as D’Arms and Jacobson themselves recognize, this entails a 
highly controversial view, on which contingent psychological facts limit the range of eligible 
judgments about the fittingness of different attitudes.  
In defense of their attempt to tie standards of an attitude’s fittingness to our actual 
propensities to have it, D’Arms and Jacobson suggest that because the purpose of such standards 
is to regulate the attitude, we should accept standards that have “significant traction” with our 
propensities to have it (118). But there are at least two problems with this defense. The first is 
that judgments about fittingness can substantially regulate our responses even when they fail to 
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prevent us from having attitudes that we judge to be unfitting, namely by causing us to avoid 
acting out of such recalcitrant attitudes (cf. Nye 2009: 149-53). The second is that D’Arms and 
Jacobson’s defense of their view seems to rely upon a potentially objectionable form of “rule 
pragmatism” about fittingness standards by portraying them as something we can or should 
construct to achieve certain ends. Pragmatic considerations about what will achieve various ends 
we care about can look just as irrelevant to the question of what fittingness standards are 
genuinely correct as they do to whether a token attitude is fitting.  
 A second set of problems concerns whether the evaluations held to be constitutive of 
attitudes can themselves be described in ways that will avoid making the FA-analyses that cite 
the attitudes viciously circular (cf. Rabinowicz and Ronnow-Rasmussen 2004: 420-2; Persson 
2007: 6n4; Louise 2009: 360-2). Evaluations of undesirable differences in possession do not 
seem to make reference to the category of the enviable. But problems quickly arise when we 
consider what evaluations could be said to be constitutive of the attitudes referenced by FA-
analyses of core ethical and evaluative categories, like that of good outcomes. What evaluation 
could be said to be constitutive of attitudes like desire for an outcome? There seems to be no 
candidate, other than “that the outcome is good.” But it looks viciously circular for an FA-
analysis to say that “What it is for an outcome O to be good is for desires that O to be fitting, 
what it is for a desire that O to be fitting is for O to meet the constitutive standards of desires that 
O, and what it is for O to meet the constitutive standards of desires that O is for O to be good.” 
 More subtle vicious circularities may arise for FA-analysts’ attempts to specify the 
constitutive concerns of other attitudes. For instance, D’Arms and Jacobson (2006: 109) suggest 
that shame constitutively evaluates its object as a “social disability.” They recognize, however, 
that this is “vague and potentially misleading” and that it would be “more accurate, but rather 
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less edifying” to say that shame constitutively evaluates its object as shameful. It seems that one 
can with perfect coherence think that intuitively non-social and non-disabling traits are shameful, 
and our only grip on D’Arms and Jacobson’s intended sense of ‘social disability’ may be that of 
something that is, well, shameful. But if this is the case, their constitutivist account of shame’s 
fittingness seems to make the FA-analysis of shameful things as things it is fitting to be ashamed 
of viciously circular, in virtue of having to appeal to shamefulness in explaining what it is for 
shame to be fitting. 
There may be certain attitudes, like envy, for which plausible constitutive concerns can 
be articulated without even tacit reference to their corresponding ethical categories. But these 
still seem to make at least tacit reference to other ethical or evaluative categories – e.g. 
someone’s having something valuable, your lack of which reflects badly on you, makes two such 
references. If an FA-analyst’s ambitions extend to giving FA-analyses of all ethical and 
evaluative categories, including those needed to explicate the allegedly constitutive concerns of 
attitudes like envy, then it seems that she cannot globally employ a constitutivist account of 
fittingness without incurring the vicious circularities described above. But perhaps constitutivism 
could be still be used more locally. For instance, D’Arms and Jacobson (2000b, 2006) suggest 
sympathetically that one might defend FA-analyses of what they call “sentimental values,” 
which correspond to the fittingness of natural emotion kinds (constituted by robust psychological 
syndromes of attention, physiological response, and motivation), while eschewing FA-analyses 
of core ethical and evaluative categories like good outcomes. Such “local” deployments of 
constitutivist accounts of fittingness should, however, have something to say about why they are 
appropriate for distinguishing fittingness from non-fittingness reasons in the cases of interest, 
even though alterative explanations of similar differences between kinds of reasons must be 
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given in other cases. This may include an explanation of what is attractive about being a “local” 
FA-analyst – distinct from the “global” motivation presented in Section 1. 
 
 
4. Formal Approaches 
 
Pamela Hieronymi suggests a way of understanding the concerns “constitutive of” an attitude, 
which has the potential to avoid at least some of the difficulties described in Section 3. 
According to Hieronymi (2005: 447-50), an answer to a question is “constitutive of” an attitude 
just in case “settling [the] question amounts to forming the attitude.” Thus, we might say that in 
envying a celebrity’s fame, one has settled in the affirmative the question as to whether her fame 
is something valuable, one’s relative lack of which reflects badly on oneself. As Hieronymi 
herself notes, this claim might sound too strong, since one can, for instance, recalcitrantly envy 
the celebrity’s fame despite one’s judgments that it is not valuable, or that one’s relative 
obscurity does not reflect badly on oneself. But Hieronymi (2005: 454n34; 2009) wants to insist 
that there is a sense in which one has “settled” the relevant question simply by having the 
attitude, since having it makes one “vulnerable to the questions and criticisms which would be 
satisfied by considerations that bear positively on the question.” For instance, if Hieronymi 
agreed that envy is constituted by commitments about relative differences in advantage that 
reflect badly on oneself, the idea would presumably be that, in envying the celebrity – even 
recalcitrantly – one can be asked “why did you envy her?,” and one’s answer should indicate a 
consideration (such as her fame and one’s relative obscurity) that one “took to” make it the case 
that she has something valuable, one’s relative lack of which reflects badly on oneself. 
 One might object to Hieronymi’s apparent assumption that there is a literal, explanatorily 
powerful sense in which even recalcitrant attitudes must involve “taking” certain ethical claims 
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to hold, despite one’s judging such claims to be false (on the strength, for instance, of D’Arms 
and Jacobson’s 2003 objections to similar “quasi-judgmentalist” views). But even if one does, 
Hieronymi’s emphasis on the relationship between taking a consideration to be a fittingness 
reason for an attitude and actually having the attitude suggests an importantly different kind of 
approach to the WKR problem. Even if our attitudes do not always respond to what we take to be 
the fittingness reasons for or against having them, there seems to be a crucial attitude-guiding 
difference between taking a consideration to be a fittingness reason as opposed to a non-
fittingness reason. This is that we can – and, barring special circumstances, do – have attitudes in 
response to what we take to be fittingness reasons for them directly, without our first having to 
do something to bring it about that we have them. Simply coming to judge that object O has a 
feature, which you already take to make attitude A fitting, can cause you to have A towards O. 
For instance, if you already accept that an outcome’s having the property 
 
PS: preventing enormous suffering at the cost of convenience and some gustatory thrills  
 
makes it fitting to desire it, then coming to learn that everyone’s becoming vegan will have 
property PS can directly cause you to desire everyone’s becoming vegan.  
Similarly, simply coming to judge that a feature, which you already take O to have, 
actually makes A fitting, can also cause you to have A towards O. For instance, you might 
initially realize that everyone’s becoming vegan has the property 
 
PAS: preventing enormous non-human animal suffering at the cost of convenience and 
some gustatory thrills for humans, 
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but start off not thinking that an outcome’s having PAS is a fittingness reason to desire it. But, 
upon further consideration of whether factors like a being’s intellectual ability (with reference to 
profoundly intellectually disabled humans) and bare biological species membership (consisting 
as it does of mere history of phylogenetic decent, phenotype-independent genotype, or 
psychology-independent morphology) should make such a difference, you might come to think 
that an outcome’s having PAS actually is a fittingness reason to desire it. This too can directly 
cause you desire everyone’s becoming vegan.  
On the other hand, it seems that we can respond to what we take to be non-fittingness 
reasons to (make ourselves) have attitudes only indirectly, by doing things to bring it about that 
we have them. Thus, those of us who take the fact that  
 
TH: A demon will harm our loved ones if we do not admire him  
 
to be a reason to (make ourselves) admire him, which does not contribute to his admirability, 
cannot admire him simply by coming to believe that TH or that TH is a reason of this kind. To 
respond to TH by admiring the demon, it seems that we must do something like psychologically 
condition ourselves to love such demons, take mind-altering drugs, or selectively attend to 
considerations that make him seem genuinely admirable.  
 This ability to respond directly to what we take to be fittingness as opposed to non-
fittingness reasons corresponds to similar distinctions between judgments about reasons with 
respect to attitudes like intentions and beliefs (Persson 2007: 4-5, 12-13; Raz 2009: 39-40, 50-2; 
Skorupski 2010, ch 10; Parfit 2011, app. A). If we take a consideration to favor intending to φ 
and actually φ-ing, we can respond to it directly by intending to φ (e.g. we can intend to be vegan 
directly in response to taking the consideration that being vegan avoids complicity in enormous 
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suffering at relatively trivial personal cost to favor intending to be – and actually being – vegan). 
But as Kavka (1983) observed, it does not seem that we can intend to φ simply in response to 
taking our intending to φ to have good consequences if they do not translate into reasons to 
actually φ (e.g. we cannot now intend to take a toxin tomorrow that will make us sick for a day 
simply because a mind reader will financially reward us for having this intention today). 
Similarly, we can believe that p directly in response to taking there to be epistemic or “truth-
related” reasons to believe that p (e.g. we can believe there are no gods directly in response to 
taking the positing of them to add complexity without any additional predictive or explanatory 
power). But as Pascal (1670) observed, it does not seem that we can believe that P simply in 
response to taking the belief that P to have good consequences (e.g. you cannot believe in gods 
simply by taking your having this belief to have good expected consequences – as Pascal 
suggested, you must do things that will “naturally make you believe,” like acting as if you had 
religious beliefs and attending religious rituals). 
 Several authors take these observations, together with the plausible idea that we must be 
able to have attitude A in response to what we take to be reasons for A, to be principled grounds 
for concluding that fittingness reasons for conative attitudes, along with epistemic reasons for 
beliefs and action-relevant reasons for intentions, are the only genuine reasons for these attitudes, 
while pragmatic reasons with respect to an attitude are merely reasons to want or get ourselves to 
have it (Persson 2007; Raz 2009; Parfit 2011; Rowland 2014). Whatever the merits of this (I 
think largely terminological) conclusion, one can use the idea of direct response to apparent 
reasons to try to solve the WKR problem in a highly general way, which also distinguishes 
judgments about epistemic reasons for beliefs and action-relevant reasons for intentions from 
pragmatic reasons for these attitudes.  
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One might try saying, for instance, that R is a fittingness reason to have A only if one can 
have A directly in response to R (Persson 2007; Raz 2009). Unfortunately, Jennie Louise (2009) 
and Andrew Reisner (2009) argue convincingly that, depending upon how we interpret ‘can 
have’, this either makes what genuine reasons we have too dependent upon the contingencies of 
our psychology, or fails to distinguish fittingness from non-fittingness reasons. What the 
forgoing observations about responsiveness to apparent reasons seem to support, however, is a 
way of distinguishing judgments about fittingness reasons from judgments about non-fittingness 
reasons. Moreover, since FA-analyses are ultimately trying to explain what is at issue between 
different ethical and evaluative views in terms of their holding different views about fittingness 
reasons, FA-analyses can – and it seems should – solve the WKR problem by explaining the 
difference between judgments about fittingness and non-fittingness reasons. This, it seems, might 
be achieved by appealing to 
 
The Response to Apparent Reasons Proposal: One judges that R is a fittingness reason 
to have A only if one can have A directly in response to one’s judgment about R. If one 
can have A only indirectly in response to one’s judgment about R, then one’s judgment is 
that R is a non-fittingness reason to make ourselves have A. 
 
 D’Arms and Jacobson (2014: 27-30) have, however, argued that judgments about 
appropriateness-making reasons pose a dilemma for this proposal. On the one hand, if we 
understand “having A directly in response to one’s judgment about R” to amount to no more than 
the judgment’s causing one to have A without one’s having to deliberately instill A in oneself, 
then certain judgments about appropriateness-making reasons seem to falsify the proposal. For 
instance, it seems that one’s judgment that it would be cold or uncaring not to feel guilt for one’s 
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causal involvement in a harm can cause one to feel guilt for it, without one’s having to 
deliberately try to instill the guilt – even if one takes oneself to be blameless. Similarly, it seems 
that one’s judgment that a joke is morally offensive can directly cause one not to be amused by it 
even if one takes such moral considerations to be irrelevant to whether the joke is genuinely 
funny. On the other hand, one might insist that these purported examples of attitudes directly 
responding to apparent non-fittingness reasons are merely examples of attitudes being directly 
caused by apparent non-fittingness reasons. But it would be viciously circular to say that one’s 
attitudes cannot count as direct responses simply because they are being caused by judgments 
about non-fittingness reasons, and it is unclear how else one can distinguish between an 
attitude’s “directly responding to” as opposed to “being directly caused by” a judgment. 
Hope that the relevant kind of “response to” judgments can be non-circularly 
distinguished from merely “being caused by them” may be found in Persson’s (2007: 5-7) 
suggestion that we should look to the inferences or “valid patterns of reasoning” in which 
judgments about fittingness as opposed to non-fittingness reasons can participate. Along these 
lines, Way (2012) suggests that fittingness reasons do not, while non-fittingness reasons do 
“transmit across facilitating attitudes,” or: 
 
Ways’ Proposal: R is a fittingness reason for attitude A only if one cannot infer from R 
that the fact that attitude B facilitates attitude A is the same kind of reason for B. If R is a 
reason with respect to A, and one can infer from R that B’s facilitating A is a reason of the 
same kind for B, then R is a non-fittingness reason to bring about A.   
 
For instance, the fact that outcome O will make Bugsy happy is a fittingness reason to desire O. If 
one irrationally hated Bugsy, and the only way one could get oneself to desire O was to first 
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admire the people Bugsy admires, this would not contribute to the fittingness of admiring them. 
On the other hand, if one had the non-fittingness reason to (make oneself) desire an odd number 
of hairs constituted by the fact that a demon will harm one’s loved ones unless one desires this, 
and the only way to instill this desire was to first desire that nothing be symmetrical, this would 
seem to give one a non-fittingness reason to (make oneself) desire that nothing be symmetrical.  
 Unfortunately, while Way’s proposal may distinguish fittingness reasons from pragmatic 
reasons to make oneself have them, it does not seem to distinguish fittingness reasons from 
appropriateness-making reasons. It is at least coherent, and indeed quite plausible, to think that 
we cannot infer from  
 
(i) R contributes to the appropriateness of having A, and  
 
(ii) B facilitates having A 
 
that (ii) contributes to the appropriateness of having B. For instance, suppose that  
 
(i’) joke M’s offensive portrayal of minorities makes it morally inappropriate to be 
amused by M, but  
 
(ii’) the only way to suppress one’s amusement at M is to be amused by joke S, which is 
both unfunny and portrays women in an offensive way.  
 
It is at least coherent, and indeed quite plausible, to think that one cannot infer from (i’) and (ii’) 
that (ii’) contributes in the least to the moral appropriateness of being amused by S. Similarly, 
suppose that 
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(i*) your friendship with Abigail, and envy’s focus on relative positions, make it 
inappropriately petty to envy Abigail’s accomplishments, but  
 
(ii*) the only way to avoid envying Abigail’s accomplishments is to envy your equally 
good friend Brittany’s accomplishments. 
 
It is at the very least coherent, and I think extremely plausible, to think that one cannot infer from 
(i*) and (ii*) that (ii*) makes it any less inappropriately petty to envy Brittany’s 
accomplishments.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
I have thus surveyed the primary motivations and problems for what I take to be the main 
approaches to solving the WKR problem. Material approaches seem to have made progress 
articulating features of pragmatic reasons to make ourselves have attitudes that distinguish them 
from fittingness reasons to have them. But existing material approaches seem to have ignored 
appropriateness-making reasons, and it is unclear how they can be extended to accommodate 
them. Constitutivist approaches hold the promise of distinguishing fittingness from 
appropriateness-making reasons, but face problems explaining the alleged “constitutive 
evaluations” of attitudes in ways that avoid vicious circularity. Constitutitivism might avoid 
certain (but not all) of these problems by limiting its scope to solving the WKR problem for FA-
analyses of a special set of ethical or evaluative categories, but this would be inconsistent with 
the ambitions and motivations of most FA-analysts, and require an alterative rationale. Formal 
approaches that look to the attitude guiding or inference-licensing features of judgments about 
fittingness as opposed to non-fittingness reasons have the potential to explain the distinction 
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between such judgments in a highly general way, which distinguishes similar judgments about 
reasons for attitudes like beliefs and intentions from judgments about pragmatic reasons for 
them. But existing formal approaches seem to have problems distinguishing judgments about 
fittingness reasons from judgments about appropriateness-making reasons. 
 Some might be tempted to conclude that these difficulties show the WKR problem to be 
insoluble, which would appear to have significant theoretical implications. Explaining the core 
normative features of ethical and evaluative categories by understanding them as categories of 
reasons for attitudes might make for a simple and unified picture of our normative categories, 
and justify focusing our fundamental metanormative efforts on understanding the foundational 
category of reasons. But if FA-analyses cannot avoid a viciously circular reference to ethical and 
evaluative categories in delineating the sorts of reasons that are supposed to do the explaining, 
this initially attractive theoretical perspective and strategy of metanormative research looks 
untenable.  
I think, however, that FA-analysts can learn from the problems I have surveyed for 
existing approaches to solving the WKR problem, and that prospects for a solution remain bright. 
FA-analysts need to pay more attention to the theoretical motivations for FA-analyses, and the 
variety of coherent judgments – especially about appropriateness-making reasons – that they 
need to adequately interpret. Along these lines, I believe that there is in particular room for 
further fruitful developments of formal approaches that pay more attention to the functional and 
inferential roles of judgments about fittingness reasons beyond direct attitude causation and the 
non-transmission of reasons across facilitating attitudes (cf. Gibbard 1990, ch 4; Nye 2009, ch 6). 
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Note 
1 Those who have encountered something like the idea of these analyses through Scanlon (1998, ch 3) often refer to 
them as ‘buck-passing accounts’. But as Jacobson (2011, §2.1) has observed, what Scanlon actually describes as a 
‘buck-passing account’ incorporates elements that are quite distinct from the view that we can explain something’s 
falling under an ethical or evaluative category in terms of there being reasons to have certain kinds of attitudes 
towards it. These include the view that something’s value does not provide reasons to value it over and above its 
value-makers (which opponents of explaining value in terms of reasons for attitudes can accept), and the possible 
view that we can explain something’s value in terms of reasons to act towards it in certain ways. This latter idea 
may be problematic from the standpoint of explaining value in terms of reasons in at least two ways. First, a feature 
of something (e.g. someone’s bravely helping others) may make for two very different kinds of value (e.g. it may 
make her both morally admirable and aesthetically inspiring), in a way that can be captured only by citing its status 
as a reason for two different kinds of attitudes (e.g. moral admiration and aesthetic appreciation), as there may be no 
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bifurcation in the acts it is a reason to perform. Second, one may not want to build into the very idea of something’s 
value the idea that we should act towards it in certain ways. One may want to explain the connection between values 
and reasons to act in terms of other principles, such as a general connection between fitting motives and reasons to 
act (cf. Anderson 1993; Skorupski 2010; Nye, Plunket, and Ku 2015).  
Fortunately, most of the literature on the Wrong Kind of Reasons problem that addresses itself to ‘buck-
passing accounts’ is concerned with them as FA-analyses in the sense I explain. But because talk of ‘buck-passing’ 
in this context can still threaten to obscure the core issues, I shall avoid all further use of it.  
